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Outline
• A very brief review of the historical evolution of the 
theory of development 
• the factors behind the interruption of the process of 
industrialization in the Southern European members of 
the Eurozone 
• implications for the policies required to sustain the 
periphery’s growth and development
• This paper draws on Simonazzi et al (2013), Simonazzi and 
Ginzburg (2015) and Ginzburg and Simonazzi (2016).
The rise and fall of development 
economics
Hirschmann (1981, p. 3): 
“The development ideas that were put forward in the forties 
and fifties shared two basic ingredients in the area of  
economics”:
- the rejection of the monoeconomics claim 
(Rostow’s stages of development vs. Gerschenkron’s
latecomer countries)
- the mutual benefit claim 
(but unequal exchange (Prebisch and Singer), cumulative 
causation and polarization (Myrdal and Hirschman) 
Washington consensus
• development is not “smoothly linear”: errors, 
retrogressions… disenchantment
• Two criticisms
- Dependency theory
- Neoclassical market economics
• Public intervention is justified only:
– Externalities
– Cost benefit analysis of intervention
• ‘Governments cannot pick winners, but losers can pick 
governments’” (Wade 2012, p. 225).
European industrial policy
• Conceived mostly in terms of market selection mechanisms, 
obtained by enforcing competition: One market, one money
• reinstated the monoeconomics claim.
- problems faced by countries at different stages of 
development ignored
- the institutions of the EU were based “on the premise that all 
its members are on a level playing field, except for ‘less 
modern’ (‘anti-competition’) institutions, individual values and 
attitudes. 
- The implicit assumption is that competition, and an 
austerity regime, associated with institutions close to those 
assumed to be prevailing in ‘core’ countries, would create in 
the periphery the ‘right’ environment for growth” 
Core-periphery relations
• Divergent trajectories of core and periphery interpreted 
as interdependent economies with different levels of 
capabilities
• Three concepts:
– distinction of countries between first-comer industrializers (the 
‘center’) and latecomers (Italy) and late-latecomers (Spain, 
Portugal and Greece) in the periphery
– level (quality) of productive structure; 
– distinction between price and product competition. 
Stages of development and differing 
capabilities
• wide differences in the productive structures of the centre and the 
southern periphery of Europe at the start of the Europeanization 
process. These differences entailed an asymmetric capacity of 
countries at differing levels of development to adjust to external 
shocks. 
• The process of development consists in moving upwards towards 
more complex, less ubiquitous, products (Hausmann and Hidalgo 
2011), but  it is far from linear: 
– it occurs through diversification into products that are “near” to those that are 
already being successfully produced and exported
– Because of the existence of discontinuities in the product space countries with a 
low diversity of capabilities can become stuck in “quiescence traps”, that make 
catching up more difficult. 
– The existence of discontinuities in the product space and the need to develop 
and coordinate those capabilities demanded by growth industries prove to be a 
formidable obstacle to the process of development.
Need for government policy
The interruption of industrialization
• The countries in the periphery started from different levels of 
industrial development, but they all recorded high income growth, 
led first by investment and consumption, and then by export. 
• They all placed special emphasis on basic industry, deemed 
necessary for the creation of an industrial sector. The state 
supported accumulation either directly, through public owned 
companies, or indirectly, through subsidies and incentives to 
domestic and foreign capital.
• differences in the production structure initially very large  were 
reduced until the beginning of the seventies, 
• but re-opened again in the subsequent years, and especially after 
the crisis of 2008.
The 1970s crisis
• Saturation of mass consumer goods in advanced countries and the 
start of globalization led to a profound transformation in demand, 
production, and competition. 
• Demand for substitution and quality competition (vertical 
diversification) favoured the passage from traditional price 
competition to markets dominated by product-led competition. 
• a profound break in the history of the relations between the centre 
and the periphery of Europe. 
• The ‘centre’ succeeds in strengthening its ability to remain in the 
market thanks to processes of ‘creative destruction’ and 
reconstruction undertaken during the crisis with the support of 
industrial policies. 
Market fundamentalism
• The restructuring of the core deeply affected the countries of the 
periphery which, in reorganizing their economies, struggled to adapt 
to the new environment (which was dominated by deflation and 
quality competition). 
• Faced with a situation that would have required innovation of the 
State’s capabilities in order to facilitate selective guidance and the 
reorientation of investment to combat a rapidly weakening economic 
structure, they adopted across-the-board liberalization policies 
instead, implementing what might be called a ‘plain destruction’ of 
their capabilities to create new products, market niches, and 
markets.
Premature de-industrialization
• Partly as a consequence of their policies, growth in the peripheral 
countries fell behind in the 1980s, and the crisis associated with 
deregulation opened a gap in aggregate demand that was 
eventually filled by welfare and construction expenditure. This 
‘premature deindustrialization’ — restructuring without 
industrialization — exposed the peripheral countries to stunted 
growth and persistent fragility with respect to external changes even 
before the formation of the Monetary Union. 
• Over the thirty years of European integration since the early 
eighties, the Southern peripheral countries were exposed to 
macroeconomic and industrial policy measures that, though 
apparently neutral, generated increasing regional disparities, both 
between center and periphery and within countries
Core and periphery 
• increasing integration of the Central and Eastern European 
economies into the supply chain of German industry speeded up 
their process of diversification- and specialization. 
• Wage restraint and price containment
• The eastward integration of German industry, combined with the 
persistent containment of the internal demand  impoverishment of 
the productive matrix of those southern regions that are less 
connected with Germany and, more generally, with a general 
redirection of trade flows.
• Since the 1970s, the international market regime is increasingly 
dominated by the competition of differentiated products. In the 
current Eurozone crisis, in a context of fixed exchange rates, 
austerity measures in the periphery are assigned the task to pursue 
a “flex-price” policy through domestic devaluation.
Summing up
• the effects of the crisis differ for first and latecomers:
• It calls for an overhaul of the production systems: obsolete capacity 
needs to be scrapped, declining sectors have to be abandoned. 
• Thanks to a stronger and broader productive capacity, core 
countries succeed in implementing a deep internal restructuring over 
a wide range of industries and services, strengthening their position 
in the product markets with the help of industrial policies
• The process of restructuring of the core affects the periphery: here, 
their basic industries and “mature” production face the competition 
from developing countries, calling for drastic cuts in production. 
• Just when the State should have taken up new tasks to ease the 
process of restructuring, diversification and quality upgrading, 'early 
liberalization' policies prevented public investment guidance: 
industrial policies were redefined as policies for the guarantee of 
competition.
The return of industrial policy
• two tenets of the “new” theory of development: 
- innovation occurs through contiguity (Hausmann e Hidalgo 2011) 
- innovation is hindered by lack of demand (Rodrik 2004).
• Changes in a country’s productive structure can be understood as a 
combination of 2 processes: 
- that by which countries find new products as yet unexplored 
combinations of the capabilities they already have, 
- the process by which countries accumulate new capabilities 
and combine them with other previously available capabilities 
to develop yet more products.
Innovative firms
• innovative businesses compete on the basis of new products or 
processes and/or more effective use of new technologies and not 
primarily on the basis of price. 
• Firms’ performance crucially depends on both the structured 
interrelationships (the linkages) that it can establish upstream and 
downstream, and the support received from the material and 
immaterial infrastructures, development agencies and financial 
institutions that sustain the process of innovation in the long term
• market prices cannot reveal the profitability of products that do not 
exist yet, and dynamic externalities can limit firms’ readiness to take 
up risky projects, 
• without public incentive and support, promising innovations may not 
be taken up by firms
Cost discovery vs innovation
• State intervention is needed not because “the government officials 
[are] omniscient or cleverer than businessmen but because they 
[can] look at things from a national and long-term point of view, 
rather than sectional, short-term point of view”
• Self-discovery: “What is involved is not [only] coming up with new 
products or processes, but “discovering” that a certain good, already 
well established in world markets, can be produced at home at low 
cost” (Rodrik 2004, 7-8). 
• Imports can signal the existence of unexploited opportunities - final 
demand for products or bottlenecks to development - that a well-
integrated policy action can help to seize.
Domestic demand and macroeconomic 
policies
• Industrial policy can encounter insurmountable obstacles if it is 
inconsistent with the main directions of macroeconomic policy. A 
strong and expanding domestic market is essential even for the 
most successful exporting firms.
• The European institutions are sending contradictory signals and 
advocating conflicting policies: the recent endorsement of an 
“industrial compact”, coexists with their strong advocacy for 
“structural reforms”, aimed at making the labor market more flexible, 
which are likely to encourage firms to move in the opposite direction. 
Fiscal consolidation and the strength of pro-liberal advocates, 
finding support in international institutions and treaties, hinder the 
implementation of a more comprehensive developmental approach 
at the national level. 
• A strategic policy of industrial development is incompatible with cuts 
in public budgets, and more generally in aggregate demand.
Conclusion
• A more balanced European economic integration requires a 
common undertaking to stop chasing emerging economies on low 
wages: this requires production upgrading, diversification and 
structural change. To this end, peripheral countries need a 
developmental state capable of broadening their productive capacity 
and increase their capabilities (to reduce the gaps between and 
within countries). This strategy is desperately lacking in the present 
economic program, which reiterates its willingness to conjugate 
financial stability and growth, but is too concentrated on (needed) 
supply side, efficiency-enhancing measures in a void of strategic 
vision. 
